Electoral systems and conflict management: Comparing STV and AV systems by Reilly, B.
         ESRC Devolution & Constitutional Change Programme            
 
 
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: 





National Centre for Development Studies 
Australian National University 
Canberra ACT 0200 
AUSTRALIA 
 
Ph: (61) 2 61250431 





In recent decades, the possibilities of explicit “electoral engineering” -- designing electoral 
systems to encourage cooperation, bargaining and inter-dependence between rival politicians 
and the groups they represent – has become increasingly attractive for promoting democracy 
in divided societies. This article looks at one strategy of electoral engineering that I call 
“centripetalism”: the use of preferential, vote-pooling electoral systems such as the Single 
Transferable Vote and the Alternative Vote to encourage cross-ethnic vote-transfers, inter-
ethnic bargaining and the development of broad, multi-ethnic political parties. This paper 
examines the empirical record of elections in a range of countries that use preferential voting 
systems – including Northern Ireland, Estonia, Australia, Fiji and Papua New Guinea. It finds 
that centripetal strategies can influence the trajectory of democracy in divided societies, but 
that its application is dependent on some important facilitating conditions, including social 
and demographic factors.  
DEMOCRACY IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES: 






What kind of electoral systems can help democracy survive in countries divided by deep 
societal cleavages, such as racial, religious, linguistic or other kinds of ethnic identities? 
Because such identities tend to be invested with a great deal of symbolic and emotional 
meaning, aspiring politicians in such ‘divided societies’ often have strong incentives to “play 
the ethnic card” at election time, using communal demands to mobilize voters. As a result, 
around the world, elections held in divided societies often heighten ethnic tensions. The 
political rewards of ‘outbidding’ – increasingly extremist rhetoric and demands -- can be 
greater than those of moderation. In such circumstances, politics can quickly come to be 
characterised by centrifugal forces, in which the moderate political centre is overwhelmed by 
extremist forces, leading to zero-sum, winner-take-all politics. The failure of democratic 
politics is often the result.1 
Any strategy for building sustainable democracy in such circumstances must place a premium 
on avoiding this depressingly familiar pattern and instead find ways to promote inter-ethnic 
accommodation, multi-ethnic political parties and moderate, centrist politics. One way to do 
this is by the design of electoral rules. Because elections help shape broader norms of 
political behaviour, scholars and practitioners alike are in widespread agreement that electoral 
systems can play a powerful role in promoting both democracy and conflict management. For 
example, by structuring the incentives and payoffs available to political actors in their search 
for electoral victory, creatively-crafted electoral rules can make some types of behaviour 
more politically rewarding than others. Over the past two decades, the possibilities of such 
“electoral engineering” -- designing electoral systems to encourage co-operation, bargaining 
and inter-dependence between rival politicians and the groups they represent – has become 
increasingly attractive for those attempting to build democracy in divided societies.2  
While there is widespread agreement on the importance of electoral systems in shaping the 
wider political arena, there is profound disagreement between political scientists as to which 
electoral systems are most appropriate for divided societies.  
 2
Two schools of thought predominate. The scholarly orthodoxy has long argued that some 
form of proportional representation (PR) is needed in the face of deep-rooted ethnic divisions. 
One influential study of the failure of post-colonial democracy in West Africa argued that 
divided societies need PR to “give minorities adequate representation, discourage 
parochialism, and force moderation on the political parties”.3 Such arguments foreshadowed, 
in part, the electoral recommendations of consociational approaches to managing ethnic 
cleavages in divided societies, which emphasise the need for divided societies to develop 
mechanisms for elite power-sharing if democracy is to survive ethnic or other conflicts. The 
scholar most associated with the consociational model, Arend Lijphart, developed this 
prescription from a detailed examination of the features of power-sharing democracy in some 
continental European countries (the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland), and there is 
disagreement over how far these measures can work (if at all) when applied to ethnic conflict 
in developing countries.4 However, there is little doubt that consociationalism represents the 
dominant — and according to Lijphart, the only — model of democracy for divided 
societies.5 In terms of electoral systems, consociationalists argue that party-list PR is the best 
choice for divided societies, as it enables all significant ethnic groups, including minorities, to 
“define themselves” into ethnically-based parties, and to gain representation in the parliament 
in proportion to their numbers in the community as a whole.6 
In contrast to this orthodoxy, some critics argue that the best way to mitigate the destructive 
patterns of divided societies is not to encourage the formation of ethnic parties and replicate 
existing ethnic divisions in the legislature, but rather to utilise electoral systems that 
encourage cooperation and accommodation between rival groups, and therefore work to 
break down the salience of ethnicity rather than foster its representation in parliament. One 
core strategy, as advocated by Donald Horowitz, is to design electoral rules which promote 
reciprocal vote-pooling, bargaining and accommodation across group lines.7 Some electoral 
systems, such as that used for presidential elections in Nigeria, require the winning candidate 
to gain support from different regions, thus helping to break down the claims of narrow 
parochialism or regionalism. Others, such as Lebanon’s, attempt to defuse the importance of 
ethnicity by pre-assigning ethnic proportions in parliament and in each constituency, thus 
requiring parties to present ethnically-mixed slates of candidates for election and making 
voters choose between them on issues other than ethnicity.  
 3
However, the most powerful electoral systems for encouraging accommodation are those 
which make politicians reciprocally dependent on the votes of members of groups other than 
their own. In this article, drawn from a book-length study, I examine the empirical record of 
one such electoral innovation as a tool of conflict management: the use of ‘preferential’ 
electoral systems which enable voters to express on the ballot a rank-ordering of their choices 
between different parties or candidates. All preferential electoral systems share a common 
feature: they enable electors to indicate how they would vote if their favoured candidate was 
defeated and they had to choose between those remaining. It is this particular feature which 
distinguishes preferential voting systems. Such systems include the ‘alternative vote’ (AV) -- 
a majority system -- and the ‘single transferable vote’ (STV) -- a form of proportional 
representation.  
AV is a majoritarian system used in single-member electoral districts which requires 
successful candidates to gain not just a plurality but an absolute majority of votes. If no 
candidate has an absolute majority of first-preferences, the candidate with the lowest number 
of first preference votes is eliminated and his or her ballots papers redistributed to remaining 
candidates according to the lower order preferences marked. This process of sequential 
elimination and transfer of votes continues until a majority winner emerges.  
STV, by contrast, is a proportional system based around multi-member districts which, 
depending on the number of members elected in each district, allows even small minorities 
access to representation. Voters rank candidates in order of preference on the ballot paper in 
the same manner as AV. The count begins by determining the ‘quota’ of votes required to 
elect a single candidate.8 Any candidate who has more first preferences than the quota is 
immediately elected. If no-one has achieved the quota, the candidate with the lowest number 
of first preferences is eliminated, and his or her second and later preferences redistributed to 
the candidates left in the race. At the same time, the ‘surplus’ votes of elected candidates (ie. 
those votes above the quota) are redistributed at a reduced value according to the second, 
third etc preferences on the ballot papers, until all seats for the constituency are filled.  
Because they enable electors to rank candidates in the order of their choice on the ballot, 
preferential systems can encourage politicians in divided societies to campaign for the 
‘second-choice’ votes of electors and provide parties and candidates with an incentive to 
‘pool votes’ across ethnic lines. To attract second-level support, candidates may need to make 
cross-ethnic appeals and demonstrate their capacity to represent groups other than their own. 
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Alternately, where a moderate or non-ethnic ‘middle’ part of the electorate exists, candidates 
may need to move to the centre on policy issues to attract these voters, or to accommodate 
fringe issues into their broader policy.  
Either way, negotiations between rival candidates and their supporters for reciprocal vote 
transfers can greatly increase prospects for transfer votes flowing from ethnic parties to non-
ethnic ones – thus encouraging, even in deeply divided societies, the formation and 
strengthening of a core ‘moderate middle’ sentiment within the electorate as a whole. Such 
negotiations can also stimulate the development of alliances between parties, and aid the 
development of multi-ethnic parties or coalitions of parties. Scholars have increasingly found 
that aggregative party systems, in which “one or two broadly-based, centrist parties fight for 
the middle ground”, can assist the consolidation of new or transitional democracies.9 
This broad approach to conflict management has been dubbed ‘centripetalism’, “because the 
explicit aim is to engineer a centripetal spin to the political system — to pull the parties 
towards moderate, compromising policies and to discover and reinforce the centre of a deeply 
divided political spectrum”.10 A centripetal political system or strategy is designed to focus 
competition at the moderate centre rather than the extremes by making politicians seek 
electoral support from groups beyond their own ethnic community. Accordingly, I use the 
term centripetalism as a shorthand for three related but distinct phenomena: 
(i) the presentation of electoral incentives for campaigning politicians to reach out to and 
attract votes from a range of ethnic groups other than their own, thus encouraging 
them to moderate their political rhetoric on potentially divisive issues and forcing 
them to broaden their policy positions in the search for cross-ethnic electoral support; 
(ii) the presence of an arena of bargaining, under which political actors from different 
groups have an incentive to come together to bargain and negotiate in the search for 
reciprocal electoral support via negotiation on vote-transfer deals and hence, perhaps, 
other more substantial issues; and 
(iii) the development of centrist, aggregative and multiethnic political parties or coalitions 
of parties which are capable of making cross-ethnic appeals and presenting a complex 
and diverse range of policy options to the electorate.  
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A recurring criticism of centripetalism is that there are insufficient real world examples to 
support the case for using preferential voting as an agent of conflict management in 
ethnically-divided societies.11 Recent years, however, have seen some remarkable recent 
experiments in using centripetal electoral rules to encourage inter-ethnic accommodation in 
divided societies as diverse as Northern Ireland, Estonia, Fiji and Papua New Guinea. 
Elsewhere, new democracies like Indonesia and Bosnia are actively considering such 
systems.12 In addition, established democracies like Australia, the United Kingdom and even 
the United States are all showing increasing interest in the utility of preferential voting as a 
means of aggregating like-minded interests and combating ‘vote-splitting’ and extremist 
forces.13 A common theme is the desire to ‘engineer’ political behaviour, by changing the 
incentives for election that campaigning politicians must respond to. The following pages 
briefly survey the combined evidence on this issue to date.  
 
Northern Ireland 
Northern Ireland is probably the best-known example of centripetal institutions encouraging 
inter-ethnic accommodation in a divided society in recent years, via the use of a preferential 
electoral system at the crucial 1998 elections held under the ‘Good Friday’ peace process. 
After 30 years of sectarian violence between Northern Ireland’s Catholic and Protestant 
communities, the Good Friday peace agreement of April 1998 provided for a range of new 
institutions aimed at managing the conflict between unionist and nationalist interests -- 
among them power-sharing elections to a new Northern Ireland Assembly held under STV 
rules. Although previous elections under similar rules had been held in 1973 and 1982 
without success, the 1998 election resulted, for the first time in Northern Ireland’s history, in 
the formation  of a ‘pro-peace’ power-sharing government.  
One reason for this outcome was the way that the STV electoral system was able to transform 
moderate sentiments in the community into a pro-peace majority in the Assembly, via vote 
transfers. Analyses of the 1998 elections found that a significant proportion of the Northern 
Ireland electorate used their lower-order preferences to transfer votes from ethnic sectarian 
parties to non-ethnic centrist ones.  
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The use of preference voting assisted the peace process in a number of ways. First, it 
provided direct incentives to the major parties to moderate their position in the hope of 
attracting preference votes from moderate voters. The possibility of picking up lower-order 
preference transfers was instrumental in moving Sinn Fein, for example, away from violence 
and towards less extreme policy positions. This movement was rewarded by moderation-
inclined voters -- as the increased flow of lower-order preferences to Sinn Fein from more 
centrist nationalist parties such as the SDLP at the 1998 poll indicated. Similarly, on the 
unionist side, STV encouraged those voting for anti-agreement unionist parties to transfer 
their lower-order votes to other unionist parties and candidates, many of whom were also 
‘pro-agreement’. 
These vote transfers worked to the benefit of the political centre, allowing pro-agreement 
communal parties such as the (Protestant) Ulster Unionists (UUP) and Progressive Unionists 
(PUP), or the (Catholic) Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), to gain lower-order 
vote transfers from other pro-agreement forces. This process also benefited some of the non-
sectarian ‘middle’ parties like the Alliance and the Women’s Coalition (which received lower 
order preference votes from both sides of the political divide). As a consequences, the major 
centrist parties were proportionately over-represented in the new assembly. Pro-agreement 
parties such as the UUP and the SDLP gained additional seats on the back of vote transfers – 
most clearly in the case of the UUP, which gained 26 percent of the parliamentary seats with 
21 percent of the first-preference vote. In short, “some of the SDLP’s and Sinn Fein’s voters 
found it rational to reward David Trimble’s UUP for making the agreement by giving its 
candidates their lower-order preferences … likewise, some of the UUP’s and PUP’s voters 
transferred their lower-order preferences to pro-agreement candidates within their own bloc, 
amongst the others, and amongst nationalists … Within-block rewards for moderation also 
occurred”.14 This had a beneficial influence both upon the types of political alliances that 
could be formed and on the eventual composition of the new Assembly, over 70 percent of 
which was made up of ‘pro-agreement’ parties. 
In short, pro-agreement parties on both sides of the sectarian divide benefited from vote 
transfers, which were essential in converting a bare ‘anti-agreement’ unionist voter majority 
into a ‘pro-agreement’ unionist parliamentary majority. This proved crucial to the eventual 
outcome: one study has concluded that the principal reason that a workable Assembly 
emerged from the 1998 elections “was the adoption, or re-adoption, of the single transferable 
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vote … voters’ lower-order preferences kept the Assembly on-track by reducing the numbers 
of seats that the anti-agreement unionist parties won in the election”.15 In sum, the ability to 
transfer votes from the flanks to the center proved to be a key element in producing a pro-
peace assembly. Of course, as its rocky recent history underlines, this may not be enough for 




Another example of the use of STV in a divided country comes from the transitional 1990 
election in Estonia, a society split between a majority national Estonian-speaking community 
(60 percent) and the minority (35 percent) immigrant Russian-speaking one. Estonia used a 
STV electoral system for its first post-Soviet national election in 1990. In contrast to 
Northern Ireland, however, analysis of this ‘one-off’ re-democratization election suggests 
little in the way of cross-ethnic voting or vote-pooling between the two communities. Studies 
found that most Russian electors, for example, voted predominantly for liberal democratic 
‘Russian’ parties, and their second preferences “went overwhelmingly to reactionary 
imperialist Russian candidates rather than liberal but ethnically Estonian ones. Likewise, 
voters with Estonian first preferences continued with Estonian names”.16 While there was 
some evidence of cross-ethnic voting, particularly support for Estonian candidates by non-
Estonian voters, it is not clear whether this was a reaction to electoral incentives.  
However, there is some evidence from Estonia that the early application of STV in the 
transition process from authoritarian to democratic rule did help to encourage the early 
development of aggregative, multi-ethnic party system -- itself a crucial agent of conflict 
management in divided societies. Some analyses found that STV’s combination of 
proportional outcomes with individual (rather than group-based) candidacy and voting 
promoted the early development of a broad-based party system in Estonia, and restricted 
incentives for parties to form purely around ethnic lines.17 Other comparative studies of 
electoral system choice in Eastern Europe concluded that optimum strategies of electoral 
system design in divided societies should attempt to “represent groups equally to diffuse 
protest actions, while promoting systems of representation that accentuate individualism” – 
and hence that STV may be “just the trick” for preventing ethnopolitical conflicts.18 
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Had STV been maintained on an ongoing basis in Estonia, it is likely that electoral strategies 
would have become more sophisticated as political actors grew more knowledgeable about 
the system and its effects. However, this was not to be: in 1992 the new parliament 
abandoned STV and changed the electoral system to a variant of list PR, after several leading 
parties calculated that a change of voting system could be to their benefit. The political effect 
of STV upon Estonian politics is thus difficult to evaluate, given the quickly changing 
conditions and the way it was adopted as a political compromise and then discarded for 
similar reasons. Taagepera points to two general lessons: first, that even a country with as 
limited a recent experience of free elections as Estonia had no problems with the relatively 
complex STV ballot, and second, that “whichever electoral rules one adopts, keep them for at 




One of the most interesting recent examples of the use of preferential voting to foil political 
extremism comes from the unlikely setting of Australia, one of the world’s most stable 
democracies. Although not a divided society, Australia has an extremely diverse population, 
with almost 40 percent being overseas-born or the offspring of overseas-born immigrants, 
most of whom come from non-English speaking countries in southern Europe, the Middle 
East, and Asia. Preferential voting systems are used for all Australian jurisdictions, in the 
form of single-member AV systems in the lower house and proportional STV systems in the 
Senate. Over the years, preferential voting has tended to push the Australian political system 
away from extremes and towards the ‘moderate middle’, while also ensuring the election of 
governments which, in most cases, enjoy the majority support of the electorate. It has also 
enabled the development of partnership arrangements between parties -- with the long-
running coalition arrangement between the conservative Liberal and National parties being 
the most prominent, but not the only, example. In recent years the other major party, the 
Australian Labor Party, has also benefited from preference flows from left-leaning minor 
parties such as the Greens and the Australian Democrats.20 
In most cases, the effect of such vote transfers has been to aggregate common interests on 
either the labour or conservative sides of politics, rather than align those interests against a 
common enemy. One graphic exception to this rule, however, occurred at the 1998 federal 
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election, due to the rising power of Pauline Hanson and her ‘One Nation’ party. One Nation 
represented a distinctively Australian version of the populist right-wing racist parties that had 
appeared in many European countries during the 1990s. First elected in 1996, Hanson 
campaigned on a platform of ending immigration, removing benefits and subsidies to 
Aborigines and other disadvantaged groups, drastically cutting taxation rates, raising tariffs, 
ending all foreign aid and removing Australia from international bodies such as the United 
Nations.  
Following a protracted period of national and international media attention, the major 
Australian parties decided to join forces to eliminate what they saw as a dangerous aberration 
in the political system. One potent way of doing this was via the suggested distribution of 
lower-order preferences which the parties gave to their supporters at election time. At the 
1998 election in Hanson’s electorate, both major parties instructed their supporters to place 
her last in their order of preference when marking their ballot (in contrast to the more familiar 
tactic of suggesting their major party opponent – from Labor or the Liberal/National 
Coalition, as the case may be – be placed last).  
The result was an instructive lesson in the application of AV rules to defeat an extremist 
candidate who commands significant core support but ultimately repels more voters than he 
or she attracts. Coming first in a nine-candidate field before the distribution of preferences, 
Hanson achieved the highest first preference total with 36 percent of the vote. But she 
received very few preference transfers from other candidates. As the count progressed into its 
final exclusion, almost three-quarters of the Labor candidate’s preferences went to a Liberal, 
who won the seat with 53.4 percent of the overall (preference-distributed) vote, even though 
he was only the third highest polling candidate on first-preferences. This result, which was 
repeated in less dramatic fashion in other seats around the country, saw One Nation largely 
eliminated from federal politics (although it did win one seat in the Senate). By contrast, the 
almost certain result under a plurality system would have seen Hanson beat a divided field of 
more moderate candidates and taking a seat in the federal parliament. The Australian example 
thus demonstrates a preventive form of conflict management: the capacity of AV to privilege 





One of the most comprehensive attempts at electoral engineering using centripetal 
approaches in recent years has taken place in Fiji, an island group in the South Pacific of 
approximately 750,000 people divided almost equally between indigenous and Indian Fijians. 
Fiji’s indigenous population are a mixture of the Melanesian and Polynesian groups found 
throughout the Pacific islands. Fiji’s Indian community, by contrast, are mostly the 
descendants of indentured labourers who came from southern India to work on Fiji’s sugar 
plantations in the 19th century under British colonialism. Fijian society and politics has long 
been characterised by an uneasy co-existence between these two communities, with Indo-
Fijians predominating in certain key areas of the economy (particularly the sugar-cane 
industry) and indigenous Fijians owning 90 percent of the land but holding limited economic 
power.  
In 1997, ten years after two military coups brought down an elected government seen as 
overly close to the Indian community -- and in the face of economic stagnation, increasing 
Indian migration, and mounting international pressure -- a new power-sharing constitution 
was promulgated that attempted to push Fiji “gradually but decisively” towards multi-ethnic 
politics. It featured an innovative package of electoral and powersharing arrangements 
designed to promote the development of open and multi-ethnic political competition, 
including an AV voting system. By making politicians from one group reliant on votes from 
the other group for their electoral success, AV could, it was argued, encourage a degree of 
vote-pooling between rival ethnic parties which could help to encourage accommodation 
between (and within) Fiji’s deeply-divided Indian and indigenous Fijian communities.21  
Fiji’s 1999 parliamentary election, the first held under the new constitution, provided an 
opportunity to put the new system to a practical test. Early signs were encouraging: political 
parties from both sides of the ethnic divide reacted to the changed incentives for election 
under the new system by making pre-election alliances. This meant that the election was 
effectively fought between two large multi-ethnic coalitions rather than between mono-ethnic 
parties of the past. Parties representing the interests of Fiji’s three designated ethnic groups – 
indigenous Fijians, Indo-Fijians and ‘General’ electors (ie European, Chinese and other 
minorities) – formed the core of both of these coalitions. Because cross-ethnic preference 
exchanges underpinned both coalitions, they also prompted the development of new 
bargaining arenas which brought together former adversaries from across the ethnic divide, 
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encouraging a degree of cross-cultural communication which had been conspicuous by its 
absence at previous elections.22 
At the election itself, an unexpectedly strong vote for the Fiji Labour Party combined with a  
fragmented indigenous Fijian vote resulted in a surprise landslide victory for one of these 
groups, the so-called People’s Coalition. Mahendra Chaudhry, the Fiji Labour Party leader, 
thus became Fiji’s first ever Indo-Fijian prime minister. Labour ran largely on a multi-ethnic, 
class-based platform, and was the only party to gain a good spread of votes in both rural and 
urban seats, although it was a poor performer in the Fijian communal seats.  
However, a number of other parties appeared to suffer at the hands of the system, leading to 
an imbalanced parliament dominated by Labour and its allies. Popular discontent on the part 
of many indigenous Fijians at the presence of an Indo-Fijian Prime Minister continued to 
simmer, and Prime Minister Chaudhrey’s sometimes outspoken advocacy of Indo-Fijian 
rights served to deepen mistrust over key issues such as land ownership. In May 2000, 
exactly one year after the 1999 election, a group of gunmen headed by a failed part-Fijian 
businessman, George Speight, burst into the parliament building and took the new 
government hostage, claiming a need to restore Fijian paramountcy to the political system. 
By the time the hostages were released and Speight and his supporters arrested, Fiji had 
returned to military rule. But in August 2001, Fiji went back to the polls under the 1997 
constitution. Again, the election campaign was fought out by two broad coalitions – this time, 
the ‘moderates’ and the ‘conservatives’. This election, held under the same AV electoral 
system, resulted in a quite different outcome to 1999, with the incumbent government of 
military-appointed indigenous Fijian Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase emerging victorious. 
As this uncertain history shows, preferential voting was a mixed success in achieving the core 
objectives of stimulating the development of peaceful multi-ethnic politics in Fiji. On the 
positive side, the expectation of cross-ethnic vote transfers was fulfilled, the opportunities for 
inter-elite bargaining that the new rules provided were exploited and adapted by elites from 
both communities and, in combination with the expectations of places at the power-sharing 
cabinet table, served to significantly cool the rhetoric of the campaign. But the outcome of 
the 1999 election in particular was also highly disproportional, with the Fiji Labour Party 
gaining an absolute majority of seats with only 32 percent of the vote, while some other 
major parties gained substantial vote shares but few (or in one case, no) seats. Some 
observers linked this unbalanced electoral outcome to the coup of a year later. At the 2001 
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election, however, these imbalances were much less in evidence. Overall, the introduction of 
preferential voting appeared to play a modest role in breaking old habits of monoethnic 
politics in Fiji. Whether this is enough to build new routines of multi-ethnic politics into the 
future, however,  remains to be seen. 
 
Papua New Guinea 
Another Pacific country, Papua New Guinea, offers perhaps the most compelling case for the 
use of preferential voting as a means of conflict management in ethnically-diverse societies. 
Papua New Guinea is a country of exceptional ethnic fragmentation, with some 840 
languages spoken by several thousand competitive ethnic micro-polities, reflecting enormous 
ethnic, cultural and regional divisions. Indeed, more languages are spoken by Papua new 
Guinea’s 5.1 million people than in all of Africa. Despite its amazingly fragmented society, 
Papua New Guinea also has one of the longest records of continuous democracy in the 
developing world, having maintained a highly competitive and participatory form of 
democratic governance since 1964.23  
In terms of electoral systems, Papua New Guinea’s first three elections – in 1964, 1968 and 
1972 – were conducted under AV rules, inherited from Australia, its colonial administrator 
until independence in 1975. This was replaced by a plurality system at independence – a 
move which had devastating consequences for the nascent political system.  
Politics in Papua New Guinea is strongly influenced by the fractionalized nature of traditional 
society, which is comprised of several thousand competing ‘clans’—extended family units—
which form the primary (and sometimes the only) unit of political loyalty. Electoral contests 
are focussed on the mobilization of clan and tribal groups, rather than around issues of public 
policy or ideology. Elections thus often have the effect of underlining the significance of 
basic clan and ethnic attachments. Since independence, elections have also encouraged a 
‘retribalization’ of ethnic groups, in which the economic importance of gaining political 
office has led to increasingly rigid group boundaries and inter-ethnic armed conflict.24 
Elections are thus one of the primary ways in which traditional enmities are mobilised in 
contemporary Papua New Guinea, even though in most cases contestation is very much for 
election to office itself, rather than larger concerns such as policy implementation, 
government formation or national ideology.  
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This was the case under both AV and plurality elections, and it remains the case today. The 
difference in pre-independence elections held under AV was that the electoral system 
appeared to encourage a degree of vote-pooling, cooperation and accommodation between 
the country’s many small tribal groups, rather than the violent competition that has become 
the norm over the past decade. Vote-pooling in pre-independence elections took place in 
three primary ways, all of which were predicated on the assumption that most voters would 
invariably give their first preference to their own clan or ‘home’ candidate. The most 
common and successful method was for candidates who had limited ‘home’ support to 
campaign widely for second-preference support amongst rival groups. For this strategy to 
succeed, candidates needed to be able to sell themselves as the ‘second-best’ choice -- which 
meant, in general, someone who would look after all groups fairly – and to campaign as much 
for second preferences as for first ones. A second strategy was for candidates with significant 
existing support bases to reach out to selected allies for secondary support. Traditional tribal 
contacts and allegiances could thus be utilised to create majority victors. A third strategy, and 
increasingly common by the time of Papua New Guinea’s independence, was for groups and 
candidates to form mutual alliances, sometimes campaigning together and urging voters to 
cast reciprocal preferences for one or the other. These alliances were a response to the 
incentives presented by AV for campaigning on a common platform, whereby the sharing of 
preferences between aligned candidates was perceived as a rational activity which maximised 
prospects of electoral victory. They also appear to have given some impetus to the need to 
organise politically, and can thus be seen as the forerunners to the establishment of political 
parties in Papua New Guinea.25  
All of these patterns disappeared when preferential voting, which was viewed as a ‘colonial’ 
imposition from Australia, was replaced with a plurality system in 1975. With no incentives 
for cooperation, elections almost immediately became zero-sum contests between rival tribal 
groups. Most seats featured scores of clan-backed candidates, resulting in winners being 
elected on increasingly miniscule vote shares. At the most recent national election in 1997, 
over half of all seats were won with less than 20 percent of the vote, and fifteen winning 
candidates gained less than 10 percent. Related factors of electoral violence and ‘vote 
splitting’ -- friendly candidates with little hope of winning the seat standing in order to ‘split’ 
an opposition block vote -- have also became a problem. Indeed, changes in the nature of 
campaigning and increasing incidences of election-related violence have been two of the 
most marked effects of the plurality system. Under AV, the winning candidates in many 
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electorates were those who cultivated the preferences of those outside their own local area. 
Today, such spreading of the net is almost inconceivable in many parts of Papua New 
Guinea, as the risks of campaigning in a hostile area tend to overshadow the (marginal) 
possibilities of picking up significant numbers of votes from rival areas. In some regions, 
candidates are virtually restricted by personal safety considerations to campaigning only 
amongst their home clans, due to the very real possibility of violence if they venture into a 
rival’s clan or tribal region.26 Recent anthropological research has concluded that traditional 
tribal enmities have been reinforced by the plurality system, whereas a return to AV would 
enable the strengthening of traditional tribal allegiances, reciprocal relationships and 
peacemaking strategies.27 
Not surprisingly, this has encouraged a strong push for a return to the pre-independence AV 
electoral system. In August 2001, following several failed attempts, Papua New Guinea’s 
parliament voted to return to a form of ‘limited’ preferential voting for future elections after 
2002, with preferences limited to three. Along with moves to strengthen executive 
government, weed out corruption in politics and promote the development of political parties, 
this move was seen as part of a last-ditch reform process aimed at turning around Papua New 
Guinea’s vibrant but chronically unstable democracy, which features shifting parliamentary 
coalitions and ongoing votes of no-confidence against the executive as part of the continual 
jockeying for political power. However, the main advantages of the electoral system reform 
are likely to be the changes they prompt in terms of electoral behaviour, and in reducing 
conflicts and tribal violence at the local level.  
 
Conclusion 
All of these cases provide important empirical evidence to evaluate claims that preferential 
electoral systems can, under certain circumstances, promote co-operation between competing 
groups in divided societies. This in itself is an important conclusion, as a recurring criticism 
of centripetal theories in general, and the case for preferential voting in particular, has been a 
perceived lack of real-world examples.28 But apparently similar institutional designs also 
appear to have had markedly different impacts in different countries. In Northern Ireland, for 
example, it is clear that vote-transfers assisted the process of moderation at the breakthrough 
1998 election. But the evidence from earlier elections held under similar rules in 1982 or 
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1973 -- or, for that matter, from Estonia’s 1990 election – is much more ambiguous. 
Similarly, Papua New Guinea’s experience with AV in the 1960s and 70s was markedly more 
successful than that of its Pacific neighbour, Fiji, more recently. Why?  
A key facilitating condition appears to be the presence of a core group of moderates, both 
amongst the political leadership and in the electorate at large. Centripetal strategies for 
conflict management assume that there is sufficient moderate sentiment within a community 
for cross-ethnic voting to be possible. In some circumstances, the presence of vote-pooling 
institutions may even encourage the development of this type of moderate core, via repeated 
inter-elite interaction within bargaining arenas. But it cannot invent moderation where none 
exists. It is likely that the lack of a moderate core at Northern Ireland’s earlier elections -- and 
its clear presence in 1998 -- was a major factor in centripetalism’s past failures as well as its 
more recent success there. This is reflected in part by the fact that, at the 1998 election, there 
were far more vote transfers from sectarian to non-sectarian ‘middle’ parties than there were 
across the ethnic divide per se.29  
The arguments for the moderation-inducing effects of preferential election rules are premised 
on the assumption that politicians are rational actors who will do what needs to be done to 
gain election. Under different types of preferential voting rules, however, ‘what needs to be 
done’ varies considerably, depending on the electoral formula in place and the social makeup 
of the electorate. For example, where a candidate is confident of achieving an absolute 
majority or winning the required quota of first preferences, they need only focus on 
maximising votes from their own supporters in order to win the seat. In cases where no 
candidate has outright majority support, however, the role of second and later preferences 
becomes crucial to attracting an overall majority. For this reason, some scholars such as 
Horowitz favour majoritarian forms of preferential voting like AV over the proportional 
variant of STV. In addition, Horowitz’s case for ‘vote pooling’ is based on the purported 
benefits of cross-ethnic voting – that is, the assumption that even in deeply divided societies, 
some electors will be prepared to give some votes, even if only lower order ones, to members 
of another ethnic group. In Northern Ireland, however, while vote transfers played an 
important role in promoting accommodation, these ran predominantly from anti- to pro-
agreement parties on the same side of the sectarian divide, or from sectarian to non-sectarian 
‘middle’ parties, rather than across the communal cleavage from a unionist candidate to a 
 16
nationalist one or vice-versa. While truly cross-communal vote transfers did occur, they were 
much less common than sectarian to non-sectarian transfers. 
Second, continuity of experience appears to be an all-important variable: the evidence 
suggests that successive elections held under the same rules encourage a gradual process of 
political learning. Structural incentives need to be kept constant over several elections before 
attempting to judge the effects of any electoral package -- particularly with preferential 
systems, where the routines of deal-making and preference-swapping by politicians, and the 
understanding of these devices by voters, takes time to emerge. In the world’s two longest-
running cases of preferential voting, Australia and Ireland, it took many years for the full 
strategic potential of vote-transfers to became clear to politicians and voters alike. By 
contrast, one reason for the lack of vote-pooling at Estonia’s 1990 STV election may have 
been that routines of interaction between political actors and the electoral rules had not had 
time to become institutionalized. In Northern Ireland, by contrast, the 25-year timespan 
between the first STV election in 1973 and the ‘Good Friday’ agreement election in 1998 
provided a much longer period for political learning to occur. The Australian experience 
underscores this: rates of preference swapping at Australian elections have increased steadily 
over recent decades. 
Third, the social context in which elections are held appears all-important. Countries like 
Northern Ireland and Estonia feature ‘bi-polar’ splits between two large and relatively 
cohesive ethnic groups, both of which were effectively guaranteed representation under 
STV’s proportional election rules. But in 1998 Northern Ireland, there was also a third group: 
the middle, non-sectarian parties which were not clearly bound to either community. By 
advantaging the representation of this group, STV promoted outcomes which would not have 
been likely under AV or other majority systems, or under the more common party list 
versions of PR either. In other cases, however, where there is greater ethnic heterogeneity or 
a much smaller non-ethnic centre, STV may work less well – indeed, did work less well at 
previous Northern Ireland elections. All of which suggests that a key element of any electoral 
engineering prescription must be a careful understanding of the prevailing social and 
demographic conditions – particularly the size, number and dispersion of ethnic groups. 
The importance of ethnic demography is highlighted by the two cases of Fiji and Papua New 
Guinea. In Fiji, most open electoral districts – which are supposed to encapsulate a ‘good 
proportion’ of members of both major communities – were drawn in such a way as to become 
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the preserve of one ethnic group or another. Because of this, genuine opportunities for inter-
ethnic cooperation at the constituency level were rare, and most contests provided no 
opportunity at all for cross-ethnic campaigns, appeals or outcomes. Only six seats were 
genuinely competitive between ethnic groups at the 1999 election.30 For the rest, clear Indian 
or Fijian majorities prevailed. Given this, it is perhaps not surprising that relatively little 
cross-ethnic vote-trading actually occurred in most seats. Indeed, the Fiji case is a good 
example of the problems of using AV in a polarized political environment: it places great 
pressure on seemingly minor bodies such as boundaries commissions to come up with 
appropriately mixed constituencies. I have argued elsewhere that STV in small, 3-member 
districts would have been a better choice for Fiji, and indeed much of the current pressure for 
electoral reform there is focussed on the need for a more proportional system.31 
Contrast this with the situation in Papua New Guinea, where the extreme fragmentation of 
traditional society meant that most electorates feature dozens of small tribal ethno-polities. 
To be elected under a majority system like AV, candidates had no option but to amass votes 
from a range of groups beyond their own: this was the only way to surpass the majority 
threshold. Under such conditions, candidates had a strong incentive to behave 
accommodatively towards rival ethnic groups to have a chance of electoral victory. Not 
surprisingly, levels of electoral violence were much lower under the AV system than under 
plurality rules at recent elections, where no such incentives have been present. 
The situation in Northern Ireland is quite unlike Papua New Guinea, but is closer to the Fijian 
case. The evidence from there does not support the argument that AV works better than STV 
in a situation of bi-communal cleavage such as Northern Ireland. If anything, the Fijian 
example demonstrates the dangers of using overtly majoritarian electoral rules in such cases. 
Overall, the comparative evidence from such cases suggests that “no change” is the wisest 
recommendation to make for Northern Ireland. 
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